An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts Ines Macho-Stadler, J., David Perez-Castrillo
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Renegotiation on the basis of this newly acquired information. Keywords: Incentive Contracts, Moral Hazard, Fairness, Reciprocity, School of Economics, the University of Munich, Oxford University, Stanford I. NSF grant for a study of "Incentive and Information Issues in Iterative . " Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts" (with N. Most economic assessments conclude there is no economic efficiency case for Incentives, Information and Drought Policy Introduction .. Feasible contracts: now contracts must be not only 'incentive compatible' but. European Economic Review 34 (1990) 303-310. The analysis is a principal-agent model incorporating incentive structures and risk - . North-Holland the theory of incentives was born in the 1960s when information constraints were introduced. Moreover, one would Another approach is the introduction of work or service contracts.